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Abstract
This paper studies the knowledge sharing between 
logistics enterprises using related game theory. To simplify 
the analysis, only two logistics enterprises A and B are 
considered the game model. To achieve knowledge sharing 
between enterprises, both enterprises involved in the 
game model must develop a feasible and optimal strategic 
combination, the strategic portfolio includes input cost for 
knowledge sharing and the final knowledge achievement, 
this paper focuses on the analysis of these two factors: the 
sharing input cost and the profit sharing ratio. According 
to game characteristics, basic assumptions, the backward 
inductive method is adopted to solve the Stackelberg 
equilibrium of the game model, then the related factors 
that affect the knowledge sharing between enterprises are 
analyzed, and learning that knowledge sharing security 
coefficient is proportional to enterprise’s optimal profit 
value, and the knowledge sharing mechanism is also 
affected by the profit distribution proportion.
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INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of knowledge economy, knowledge has 
become a key resource for all kinds of enterprises to gain 
competitive advantage. Especially for logistics enterprises, 
the application of knowledge management can improve 
market competitiveness, maximize enterprise profit and 
minimize cost. In knowledge management, knowledge 
sharing is especially important. Knowledge operation 
among logistics enterprises is complicated, because the 
logistics resources of single enterprise are limited, it is 
difficult to achieve low-cost and high-quality logistics 
services, also can not bring customers high satisfaction. 
Through knowledge sharing among related logistics 
enterprises, logistics enterprises without large-scale 
investment can take advantage of the knowledge of the 
partner companies, especially logistics service resources 
to increase the variety and expand geographic coverage of 
logistics services to provide customers “one-stop” service, 
expand market share and improve competitiveness, and 
thus benefit from joint marketing and sales activities. 
Therefore, the knowledge sharing among related logistics 
enterprises in the supply chain will help reduce logistics 
cost and improves the income of the enterprise and supply 
chain, so as to further enhance the core competitiveness 
of the supply chain to achieve the goal of “win-win”. 
This article is trying to use the method of game analysis, 
seek the Stackelberg equilibrium of knowledge sharing 
between logistics enterprises to obtain the conditions for 
knowledge sharing between logistics enterprises, and 
present related measures for your reference.
1.  BAsIC AssUmpTIONs Of mODel 
AND VARIABle seTTINgs
1.1  model Basic Assumptions
●  Game participants collection. To simplify the 
analysis, only two logistics enterprises A and B 
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are considered the game model.
●  Game participates are rational person. Rational 
people have a well-defined preference, which 
can maximize their own preferences consciously 
facing given constraints. They usually want 
to get the maximum interests as the decision-
making principle.
●  Take the initiative to collect information. For a 
more comprehensive and accurate understanding 
of the role of both sides in the game, each partner 
wants to understand the strategy, payment and 
other information of other enterprise on the 
initiative.
1.2  model Variables settings
●  The total investment cost. The knowledge sharing 
process can be divided into two processes, 
namely  “Supply” and “demand”, so enterprise 
investment cost can be divided into two parts of 
the knowledge supply cost Ds
 
and the knowledge 











Knowledge sharing expected revenue E, the allocation 
of income for E
_
. This article is for the forecast and 
judgment of economical efficiency before knowledge 
sharing between the enterprises, so we use the revenue 
“expectations” to measure the profit level of knowledge 
sharing and revenue expectations in this article come from 
the judgment on the total earnings of the two enterprises, 
which is the judgment on the revenue expectations of 
knowledge sharing.
Elasticity coefficient α and β for the cost of inputs 
being converted to the expected revenue. Because of 
the difference of hardware facilities, software, ability, 
strategic development direction, etc. between the 
enterprises, the revenue from the knowledge conversion 
of each enterprise are different, this leads to the different 
coefficients of elasticity. Assume that enterprise A is α , 
and the elasticity coefficient of enterprises B is β, then set 
α>0 and β>0.
The maximum expected revenue λ. Same as expected 
revenue, saturation point also refers to the maximum 
expected return that the two enterprises reached. Expected 
revenue E
 
is affected by knowledge sharing input cost D 
of the two enterprises, and E is the non-linear function of 
the input cost D (Samaddar & Kadilyala, 2006). With the 
D increases to a certain extent, E tends to saturation point 
and reach theoretical maximum value of expect revenue. 
Since it is assumed that elasticity coefficient α and β are 
greater than zero, then:
    EA=λA-D
-α
A
    EB=λB-D
-β
B (1)
Knowledge sharing safety factor S, and 0≤S≤1. 
Although this article is a judgment on the economy 
before the formation of knowledge-sharing, but still 
need to take into account the problem of shared risk, the 
risk needs to be incorporated into the judgment of the 
economy. Knowledge sharing safety factor refers to the 
risk coefficient because of the exit midway of member 
enterprises, stealing intellectual property, and knowledge 
sharing delay.
The income distribution ratio is X, and 0 ≤X≤ 1. If the 
profit sharing ratio of enterprise A is X, then the profit 
sharing ratio of enterprise B is (1-X). Based on the optimal 
income core enterprise can adjust the proportion of the 
ratio to stimulate member enterprises into the knowledge-
sharing, and willing to contribute their knowledge to the 
most degree.
Enterprise profit π through knowledge sharing. 
Enterprise knowledge sharing profit is equal to the 
expected revenue minus own knowledge sharing input 
cost, and makes the optimal revenue as the goal of 
knowledge sharing.
Based on the above basic assumptions and analysis, 











































2.  eQUIlIBRIUm sOlUTIONs
To achieve knowledge sharing between enterprises, both 
enterprises involved in the game model must develop a 
feasible and optimal strategic combination. To simplify 
analysis, the strategic portfolio includes input cost for 
knowledge sharing and the final knowledge achievement, 
this article will focus on the analysis of these two 
factors: the sharing input cost and the profit sharing ratio. 
According to game characteristics, basic assumptions, 
the backward inductive method is adopted to solve the 
Stackelberg equilibrium (Iijima& Sugawara, 2005) of the 
game model, specific ideas are as follows.
From the game model we can see, it is assumed that 
the enterprise A makes DA as its knowledge sharing input 
cost based on their own actual strength and experience 
of innovation, according to DA and the ability to convert 
knowledge into revenue, enterprise B may make the 
optimal choice strategy, put forward its own optimal 
investment cost for knowledge sharing, and feed back to 
enterprise A. After getting the information from enterprise 
B, enterprise A can make its optimal choice, weighing the 
allocation ratio, to stimulate enterprise B  a more positive 
contribution to his own knowledge for knowledge sharing. 
At this point, the economic judgment of knowledge 
sharing comes to the end, and then the next type of game 
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process will come, it is not the focus of this study, so 
the further discussion will not be made any longer. In 
accordance with the process of the game, firstly assumed 
enterprise A set its own input cost DA, and then enterprise 
B begins to make the optimal decision that is how to 
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Now enterprise B has optimized its own profit through 
knowledge sharing between the two enterprises.
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 as input cost for knowledge 
sharing, or enterprise B forwardly feeds back the input 
proportion to enterprise A, the problem of enterprise A in 
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So the optimal profit function of enterprise A can be 
obtained.
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Right now, the Stackelberg balance between enterprises 
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Let D*A and D
*
B be substituted into the profit function 
(4) and (6) separately, the optimal profit value of each 
enterprise can be obtained:
*
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To sum up, based on the Stackelberg game model, the 
optimal proportion of input costs for knowledge sharing 
will be:
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Now both sides can achieve the optimal profit, so the 
optimal profit functions of the two enterprises are:
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3.  gAme ResUlT AND DIsCUssION
It can be seen through the optimal profit functions of 
enterprise A and B that the value of enterprise profit is 
influenced by the knowledge of sharing safety factor S, 
the proportion X of revenue distribution, the expected 
revenue limit value λ, and the elastic coefficient α and β of 
expected revenue. Also note, the expected revenue limit 
value λA and λB can be regarded as constants because they 
will vary due to the field of logistics enterprises focus 
on different projects. At the same time, the coefficients 
of elasticity α and β for converting input costs to the 
expected revenue can also be regarded as constants 
(Zhang, 2004). Nevertheless, the safety factor S and the 
proportion of the distribution benefits X can be changed 
by adequate communication between the enterprises, 
which should become the focus of attention.
3.1  Knowledge sharing safety factor s
Through Sackelberg game model analysis, there are four 
crucial factors to improve cooperative intention and profit 
level: knowledge sharing safety factor S, the distribution 
benefits proportion X, and the coefficients of elasticity  α 
and β for converting input costs to the expected revenue. 
The elasticity coefficients will not change in a short 
period of time which can be regarded as constants. 
Through analysis of Stackelberg game model, the profit of 
enterprise A is:
*
AD = αα +1
1
)( SX ; 1
1






























































































































AD = αα +1
1
)( SX ， 1
1












































** βα λλ −− −+−×× BBAA DDSX -
*



































After the first derivation of safety factor S:
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Then deform the above equation:
D αα +1
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Because of S>0, so 
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∂ )( *π >0, the profit of enterprise 
A is in proportion to the safety factor S of knowledge 
sharing.
Likewise, the profit of enterprise B  is also in 
proportion to the safety factor S. Obviously, it is necessary 
to improve the value of S for both enterprises to increase 
their profits through knowledge sharing.
3.2  Profit Distribution Proportion X
When the profit distribution proportion X tends to 1, 
from the perspective of enterprise A, it tends to occupy 
the largest proportion of the profit distribution. By 
formula (13), in terms of the input costs for the two 









* )( += ββSDB
, in addition, because (1-X)tends to 0, 
D*B ≈ 0, this means that the knowledge sharing input of 
enterprise B is zero, making it impossible to bring out any 
knowledge sharing  (Chen & Lin, 2005). On the contrary, 
when the profit distribution proportion X tends to 0, from 
the perspective of enterprise A, by formula (13), enterprise 
A will reach the minimum value of its own input cost, 
D*A tends to 0. For enterprise B, X tends to 0 means (1-X) 
tends to 1, then the knowledge sharing input will reach 








* )( += ββSDB , so enterprise A will 
be reluctant to invest any money, manpower, hardware 
and software resources, knowledge sharing between the 
enterprises will fail.
According to fairness theory, it is undesirable whether 
the profit distribution proportion X is close to 0 or 1 
(Ning & Fan, 2006). When it tends to 1, the sympathetic 
disutility of enterprise A will increase with the unfair 
distribution of profit, at the same time, the jealous 
disutility of enterprise B will increase. Conversely, when 
X tends to 0, because of the unfair profit distribution, the 
jealous disutility of enterprise A will increase, meanwhile, 
it will also lead to the increase of sympathy disutility of 
enterprise B . These two cases will both reduce the total 
utility of the two enterprises.
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